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Nadine Gordimer and the Force of  Law:  
Revisiting My Son’s Story
Nadine Gordimer never gave up on the notion that new modes of  justice for racial vio-
lence are linked inextricably to literary production. This essay draws on her novel My Son’s 
Story (1990) to demonstrate how Gordimer remakes the law as an ameliorative force that 
undermines the “vocabulary of  violence,” as she once described it, through which apartheid-era 
law was created.
The language of  law itself  cannot produce political change, Gordimer suggested at 
the Oslo Conference in 1990: “[T]he law in a new South Africa will outlaw all racism 
[…]. And all of  us who are sincere in the will to create a new South Africa are pledged 
to that end, not as some rhetorical ideal […] but as a series of  practical acts that will be 
carried out against all odds” (Gordimer, “After Apartheid”). Given Gordimer’s insis-
tence that we move beyond political rhetoric and toward practical action, readers might 
be surprised that she left Oslo to continue work on a novel. Gordimer never gave up 
on the notion that new modes of  justice for racial violence are linked inextricably to 
literary production. Indeed, in personal correspondence with the author shortly before 
her death, Gordimer confirmed to me that George Bizos, Nelson Mandela’s eminent 
attorney, drafted the legal language in much of  her fiction.1 
Toward the end of  the final State of  Emergency in South Africa, Gordimer began 
writing My Son’s Story (1990), a novel that ultimately was published just after Nelson 
Mandela’s release from prison. The novel thus inhabits a distinct temporality – or atem-
porality, as I will argue here – in which the end of  the violent, racist law of  apartheid 
was in sight and the concept of  a free South Africa was coming into existence. In this 
liminal moment, I contend that Gordimer uses fiction to reveal the possibility for a 
literary “force of  law.”2 This is not to say that Gordimer did not find power in the law. 
In fact, in addition to asking Bizos to prepare the legal language in her fiction, she often 
was preoccupied with its legitimacy, noting in manuscript edits, for example, “as this 
is a quote from a law it must be accurate” (Gordimer, “After Apartheid”). Gordimer’s 
concern with the credibility of  legal language in her fiction underscores how she sought 
to wield the power of  law within literature.
This essay argues that fiction can produce new ideas for developing a force of  law 
outside the ideological constraints of  geopolitical time. In the essay, I consider Jacques 
Derrida’s assertion that law in the abstract inherently is tethered to a history of  law-
enforcing violence, and that as a result the law lacks capacity to produce justice. Break-
ing free from the ideological boundaries of  apartheid lawmaking and law enforcing, 
My Son’s Story develops a new model of  time-space that is free from those ideological 
controls. The novel is able to perform this task in part because of  the moment when it 
appears: in 1990, the apartheid system is on the brink of  yielding to a democratic South 
Africa. Operating within this liminal opening, I argue that that novel generates a new 
literary time-space that I will call the “Zero chronotope” in which law as a historical 
1. Personal correspondence with the author, July 2013.
2. The term “force of  law” derives from Derrida’s lecture, “Force of  Law: The Mystical Foundations of  Authority.”
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construct can be destroyed and a new force of  law can arise.3 The Zero chronotope 
refers to a temporal point of  origin that is tied neither to what has come before it nor 
to what will follow – a moment of  suspension. Hannah Arendt discusses such a period 
of  suspended time and its political uses, describing an
odd in-between period which sometimes inserts itself  into historical time when not only 
the later historians but the actors and witnesses, the living themselves, become aware of  
an interval in time which is altogether determined by things that are no longer and by 
things that are not yet. In history, these intervals have shown more than once that they 
may contain the moment of  truth. (9)
To be clear, the essay does not suggest that a novel like My Son’s Story can be treated as 
an alternative to existing law. Rather, I contend that My Son’s Story, and other fiction that 
might produce a Zero chronotope, offer new ways for conceiving of  laws that might 
push back against the harms of  laws created – consciously or subconsciously – within 
the confines of  racist ideology. In other words, we might view a work of  fiction like My 
Son’s Story as offering a new model for jurisprudence and, accordingly, a new theoretical 
base from which laws might be written, enacted, and enforced.
I begin by looking at the scholarly reception of  My Son’s Story, explaining how atten-
tion to the novel largely has been limited to a particular period in South African history. 
I seek to reinvigorate interest in My Son’s Story, exploring its capacity to speak to political 
power beyond the historical moment in which it initially appeared. Next, I assess Der-
rida’s discussion of  the force of  law, showing how an alternate, ameliorative force of  
law requires a new conception of  time-space. From here, I consider the ways in which 
literary time-space, or Mikhail Bakhtin’s model of  the “chronotope,” might help us to 
conceive of  the Zero chronotope in My Son’s Story. Finally, I turn to the text of  the novel 
to demonstrate how it breaks down historical conceptions of  “the law” and develops 
the Zero chronotope in which a new force of  law might arise.
Recovering My Son’s Story from South African History
Since the publication of  My Son’s Story, the novel has occupied a distinct political posi-
tion in Gordimer’s catalogue of  work, largely tied to the early years of  free South Africa. 
This essay seeks to revive the novel from its historical fixity and to demonstrate how it 
offers a new way to conceive of  literature’s political power in resisting the ideological 
constraints of  racist law. The novel tells the story of  a father, Sonny, and his son, Will, 
living in Johannesburg during the final State of  Emergency. Sonny, a “coloured” man 
who used to be a schoolteacher, has become involved in African National Congress 
(ANC) politics and has been imprisoned as a result of  his activism. During his impris-
onment, a white human rights activist named Hannah provides Sonny’s family – Will, 
but also Sonny’s wife, Aila, and daughter, Baby – with information, and regularly visits 
Sonny in prison. After his release, Sonny begins an extramarital affair with Hannah, 
during which time Aila becomes an ANC activist in secret and Baby leaves South Africa. 
By the end of  the novel, Sonny’s affair with Hannah has ended unceremoniously, Aila 
has gone into exile after her arrest for political activism, and white residents have fire-
3. Bakhtin notably defines the “intrinsic connectedness of  temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed in literature” as a “chronotope,” or “time space” (84). For detailed analyses of  Bakhtin’s chronotope, see, for 
example, Bemong et al, Falconer, Holquist, and Steinby.
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bombed Sonny’s home, leaving it in ruins. Will, the narrator, ultimately becomes a writer 
himself  and a critic of  the apartheid regime.
In the early 1990s just after the novel’s release – at a moment when a democratic 
constitution and models for remedying the harms of  apartheid were taking shape – 
numerous scholars examined My Son’s Story through the lens of  contemporary South 
African politics. Stephen Clingman, a long-time reader and critic of  Gordimer’s work, 
suggested that it depicted an intellectual or theoretical engagement with a specific 
liminal moment: apartheid was ending but a free South Africa had not yet come into 
existence. However, Clingman stopped short of  suggesting that the novel could wield 
power beyond a mere thought exercise, describing the novel as inward-looking and 
“registering, in the main, ‘mentality’” (xxvii). Liliane Louvel observed how My Son’s 
Story presented a microcosm for the newly free South Africa in which racial divisions re- 
mained, yet optimism reigned in looking toward the future (30). As Louvel argued, the 
text’s fragmentary form and discontinuity in diction ultimately yield a formal reconci-
liation of  sorts: “[T]he isotopy of  fragmentation constitutes a unifying web structurally 
present at the level of  story, text, and narration” (28). Similarly, Jorshinelle Sonza des-
cribed My Son’s Story as a novel tasked with “recording social and political events,” like 
Gordimer’s previous fiction, and “reconciling racial and gender conflicts” in free South 
Africa (105). Linda Weinhouse’s scholarship on the novel attended more specifically to 
the limits of  racial rapprochement in a newly free South Africa. Commenting on Gor-
dimer’s first attempt at writing a coloured male protagonist, Weinhouse underscored 
that, “despite the fact that the narrative demonstrates that the voice of  the ‘other’ can 
be heard and imagined, Gordimer’s attitude toward her own whiteness […] is resentful 
and hostile” (71). Likewise, Ipshita Chanda questioned the larger-scale limits of  racial 
representation and the “implications of  Gordimer’s work […] for the milieu in which 
she lives,” ultimately suggesting that My Son’s Story attended to contemporary politics 
but had limited force outside Gordimer’s committed readership (58).
Other scholarship addressed shifts in the South African constitutional law that 
sought to remedy institutionalized sex discrimination under apartheid, but nonetheless 
focused on what My Son’s Story could tell its readers about gender-based equality. For 
example, K.C. Baral contended that the novel “propos[ed] a future South Africa, not 
only on terms of  equality of  races but of  sexes, too” (123), while Nancy Topping Bazin 
considered the novel in relation to the politics of  interracial sex on the cusp of  the free 
South Africa’s coming into being. Although she also discussed the post-apartheid poli-
tical implications of  the novel, Barbara Temple-Thurson saliently announced My Son’s 
Story as “Gordimer’s first unequivocally feminist novel” in her 1993 keynote address at 
the Conference on Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies (5).
The novel largely fell out of  favor with scholars interested in the political relevance 
of  Gordimer’s work in the wake of  the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC). In fact, only one peer-reviewed work returned to My Son’s Story in the 
twenty-first century. After the initial close of  the TRC in 1998, Lars Engle questioned 
the “utility and power of  the Western literary tradition” – including Gordimer’s fiction 
– given that the Western literary tradition long has been an “instrument of  oppression” 
(114). In other words, he suggested that Gordimer’s fiction might be relevant only in 
that it serves as evidence of  its own political irrelevance in a period marked by Western 
neo-imperialism and racist law. I argue that My Son’s Story not only has relevance for its 
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own political moment, but that it also demonstrates a radical function of  fiction across 
time and space.
On Derrida, or the Force of  Law in Literary Time-Space
Given Derrida’s contention that the law itself  cannot produce justice, I want to consid-
er whether alternative forms of  language that are not, in the literal sense, law-creating 
might produce substitute models of  legal language that can be used for ameliorative 
purposes. More specifically, I want to interrogate whether fiction, such as Gordimer’s 
novel My Son’s Story, might be able to conceive a force of  law that resists the ideolog-
ical constraints through which the language and function of  racist laws of  apartheid 
arise. This essay asks whether fiction can break down ideological borders of  “the law” 
as a construct to produce an ameliorative political language that could better enable 
marginalized persons to exercise rights and privileges. The theoretical force of  law was 
conceived by Derrida in a public address given in April 1990 shortly before the final 
State of  Emergency ended in South Africa, and just a few months before Gordimer’s 
previously quoted Oslo Conference remarks on the power of  literature to make law. 
The address critiqued the theoretical concept of  justice and its practical implications – a 
question looming large in South Africa at that time. Derrida’s address, “Force of  Law: 
The Mystical Foundations of  Authority,” revisits a Walter Benjamin essay, “Critique of  
Violence,” to consider the limitations of  law in producing justice. Derrida intimates that 
the law as we know it – a system of  rules that governs persons, governs a nation-state – 
inherently produces harm because of  violence intrinsic to the term itself.
Even if  laws are created to protect a vulnerable population, Derrida suggests that 
those laws by their nature necessarily include the notion of  enforceability and thus pre-
clude them from producing justice for marginalized bodies and voices. Enforceability in 
and of  itself  carries with it a capacity for violence and harm: “the word ‘enforceability’ 
reminds us that there is no such thing as law […] that doesn’t imply, in itself, a priori, in 
the analytic structure of  its concept, the possibility of  being ‘enforced,’ applied by force” 
(925). Derrida undercuts the oft-cited distinction between an ethical force of  law that 
produces justice and the unjust violence that often is employed to enforce unjust laws and 
asks, “how are we to distinguish between this force of  law […] and the violence that 
one always deems unjust?” (927). This duality of  law makes it impossible to “distinguish 
between the force of  law of  a legitimate power and the supposedly originary violence 
that must have established this authority and that could not itself  have been authorized 
by any anterior legitimacy” (927). In sum, while it may be possible to conceive of  a law 
designed and even put to use on behalf  of  marginalized groups, even that category of  
law – like all of  law – already implies a violent force or enforceability. That potential 
for violence, Derrida argues, cannot be separated from the enforcing violence of  racist 
law like that in apartheid-era South Africa.4 Given Gordimer’s insistence on the power 
wielded by the law and legal language, it is important to raise potential objections to 
Derrida. Gordimer’s concern with the law intimates that the latent potential for violence 
in the law may not be sufficient for considering it inherently flawed, as Derrida implies. 
4. Gordimer herself  might have been trapped by the ideological boundaries in which she wrote, given that she once 
imagined a fairer South Africa as one in which “a more equitable distribution of  wealth may be enforced by laws” (Living 
265).
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Rather, in Gordimer’s estimation, the positive applications of  law may, in some cases, 
outweigh the potential for violence contained within Derrida’s conception of  law.
In Derrida’s conception, is there a possibility for an alternate force of  law that in-
herently does good, or at least has the capacity to do so? I want to suggest that this 
possibility does exist and that it is tied to the notion of  “originary violence” used by 
Derrida. Since all law as we know it inherently carries with it the “originary violence” 
of  enforceability, to make law anew we must find a way to create a new origin story. 
Derrida intimates that law must take a new form if  it is to do justice, and that it must be 
distinctly tethered to an immediate temporality that breaks from the past.5 That force 
of  law must reconsider the very forms through which to produce justice for large-scale, 
racially motivated political violence since “there is no justice except to the degree that 
some event is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipa-
tions, and so forth” (971). Such an unexpected event, I argue, might occur in imagina-
tive literature given fiction’s “peculiar attribute of  being able to stage and suspend all 
the presupposition upon which any such institution rests – among them the operation 
of  laws” (“Before” 181).
By Derrida’s account, connections among fiction, justice, and the force of  law must 
not only conceive new formal structures, but also new approaches to time and tempo-
rality.6 Barbara Leckie observes how, for Derrida, both law and literature often are ideo-
logical prisoners to the sociopolitical conditions that have named them (40).7 As such, 
there is a salient need to break from a historical trajectory, developing instead an atem-
poral moment from which to make law and literature outside those ideological confines. 
When we talk about justice and temporality with regard to fiction, need we address tem-
porality only within a work of  fiction, or must we also look to the temporal moment in 
which a work of  imaginative literature was produced and circulated? I contend that both 
the fictional time-space – the Zero chronotope – of  the novel, as well as its geopolitical 
time-space, are necessary to consider how an alternate force of  law can arise in fiction.
My Son’s Story offers the possibility that both the political-historical moment in which 
a novel is written and circulated, along with its content, together give rise to new liter-
ary time-space models, which in turn can yield new ideas for political engagement. 
In considering whether Gordimer’s fiction can give rise to an alternate, ameliorative 
“force of  law,” I maintain that time and space – both within and outside the novel – 
play an essential role in breaking down ideological boundaries. Can a novel construct 
alternative historical time, thereby opening up opportunities for political resistance? 
Frederick Cooper discusses the need to produce new historical time that is not mar-
red by a violent colonial past. Previous scholars have had “difficulty in separating the 
asymmetry of  power from a totality,” Cooper argues, given that “they can show that 
5. Derrida writes of  the immediate but elusive temporality of  justice: “justice remains, is yet, to come,” yet “however 
unpresentable it may be, doesn’t wait” (969). Elisabeth Weber underscores that, for Derrida, justice is “an infinite task 
and responsibility that […] cannot be relegated to tomorrow” (38).
6. Scholars across disciplines have considered the implications of  Derrida’s “Force of  Law” lecture with regard 
to literature and politics. Derek Attridge intimates that there is a “force” of  literary theoretical readings and of  reader 
responsibility” (5-6). Samir Haddad emphasizes that Derrida’s work on fiction is tied to practical concerns about vio-
lence, justice, and the law (122), while Barbara Leckie similarly argues both law and literature, for Derrida, “are deeply 
concerned with issues of  representation in the service of  participatory democracy” (111).
7. See Louis Althusser’s Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, which details the ideological constraints that prevent 
us from thinking outside the state. In The Origins of  Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt maintains that the ability truly to think 
outside ideological boundaries marks the failure of  a violent regime aimed at totality.
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such successful challenges to power as […] anti-apartheid movements did not fully 
overthrow the inequalities they challenged or escape the frameworks of  social order 
that imperial expansion produced” yet cannot articulate why in terms of  the temporality 
and shape of  historical moments (31).
My Son’s Story presents a unique opportunity to consider the function of  imaginative 
literature in responding to contentions like Cooper’s. This argument has two necessary 
components. First, the novel produces a new temporal moment, tied neither to past 
nor present. The novel was written and published during the moment between apartheid 
ending and free South African coming to fruition – what Gordimer might have des-
cribed, along with critics of  her work, as an “interregnum.” Yet the use of  the term 
“interregnum” is tied distinctly to a past and future. I argue that the marked political 
break after apartheid ends yet before a free South Africa comes into existence is so pre-
carious that it might be conceived of  as atemporal, or a moment that cannot be tied to 
a past and may not produce a knowable future. Accordingly, that Gordimer writes and 
publishes My Son’s Story at this moment might allow it to exist in an almost atemporal 
space where ideological pressures of  past and future briefly relent. Second, it is precisely 
this moment of  suspension that falls between the end of  the final State of  Emergency 
and the official dismantling of  the laws of  apartheid that gives the novel the ability to 
develop the internal Zero chronotope.
To explain how the Zero chronotope of  My Son’s Story might open up new ways of  
conceiving a legal or political function of  fiction, I want to turn briefly to the theoret-
ical underpinnings of  Bakhtin’s chronotope and the notion that aesthetic texts might 
produce alternate and necessary historical time. That aesthetic or literary works might 
create new time-space models to resist existing political ones is well studied across fields. 
As George Kubler wrote of  visual art, “the number of  ways for things to occupy time is 
probably no more unlimited than the number of  ways in which matter occupies space” 
(96). Kubler intimated that art can push back against Western historical trajectories of  
time and space given that “[h]istory has […] no theory of  temporal structure” (96). 
Accordingly, aesthetic works can produce new visualizations of  time-space patterns, or 
even seemingly nonexistent atemporalities in which “[a] rapid succession of  events is a 
dense array; a slow succession with many interruptions is sparse” (97). Kubler’s critique 
suggests that new temporalities can arise outside any known temporal structure. I want 
to build from here, considering temporal moments that not only are outside any tempo-
ral structure, but that also resist the products of  abutting temporalities.
Can fiction really inhabit, and potentially create, a chronotope that exists outside the 
historical-political forces pushing on either side of  it? In the case of  My Son’s Story, can 
fiction produce the Zero chronotope, which operates outside the bounds of  traditional 
historical time and allows for the creation of  a new “force of  law”? Bakhtin lays the 
theoretical groundwork for such a possibility when he suggests that imaginative litera-
ture can produce “time-sequences that are neither historical, quotidian, biographical, 
nor even biological and maturational” (91). Indeed, “actions lie outside these sequences, 
beyond the reach of  that force” (91). And perhaps most importantly, Bakhtin explains 
how these time-sequences can exist outside the ideological constraints of  a past or 
future: “This empty time leaves no traces anywhere, no indications of  its passing. This, 
we repeat, is an extratemporal hiatus that appears between two moments of  a real time 
sequence” (91). In this way, a Zero chronotope might resemble what Bakhtin describes 
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as an “alien world: everything in it is indefinite, unknown, foreign” (101). In such an 
“alien world,” Bakhtin suggests that the “heroes are there for the first time; they have no 
organic ties or relationships with it; the laws governing the sociopolitical and everyday 
life of  this world are foreign to them” and thus have the capacity to think and to create 
outside them (101).
Bakhtin’s work intimates that literary fiction need not carry historical traces, chal-
lenging Walter Benjamin’s claim that, always, “the past carries with it a temporal index” 
(Benjamin, “Concept” 1). It is through the alien chronotope, Bakhtin suggests, that the 
reader might access “the earliest traces of  historical time” (129). Fiction makes it pos-
sible, in other words, to develop a time-space orientation that is outside one marked by 
a historical trajectory and its accompanying ideological constraints. Indeed, the chrono-
tope developed by a fictional work can become “the boundary line between two epochs” 
(158). Bakhtin ultimately implies that literature gives us an opportunity to deny the tem-
poral linkages that require an “earlier” and a “later”; instead, the novel might generate 
a chronotope that exists outside those temporal linkages and thus is free of  ideological 
pressure. (158). The fact that “the represented world” in narrative fiction, “however 
realistic and truthful, can never be chronotopically identical with the real world it repre-
sents” (256), is precisely where the power of  My Son’s Story lies. Since it is always already 
outside of  the real world despite referring to it, fiction has the ability to produce a new 
origin story, or the kind of  “originary violence” that Derrida suggests is necessary in 
any definition – or re-definition – of  the law.
Here, Gordimer readers and scholars might think specifically about the “interreg-
num.” In 1982, Gordimer gave the lecture “Living in the Interregnum” in which she 
defined the state of  “interregnum” as one “not only between two social orders but also 
between two identities, one known and discarded, the other unknown and undeter-
mined” (269-70). In using the term, Gordimer referred to what seemed like looming 
revolution in South Africa to overthrow the apartheid regime. While the term certainly 
speaks to an “in-betweenness,” the “interregnum” is tied indelibly to material and histor-
ical temporalities in a way that I want to resist. To be sure, Gordimer further discusses 
the “interregnum” as the “perceptual clutter of  curled photographs of  master and ser-
vant relationships, the 78 rpms of  history repeating the conditioning of  the past” (270). 
Since “literary standards and standards of  human justice are hopelessly confused in the 
interregnum,” and because it is a condition “imposed by history,” the “interregnum” 
cannot be a time-space in which law can be made anew (268, 275). While the Zero chro-
notope invokes Gordimer’s use of  the term “interregnum” in its discussion of  an in-
between time-space formulation, the Zero chronotope pushes back against any tethering 
to historical time. To be clear, while the term “interregnum” has been used to describe 
the transition between apartheid-era and free South Africa, I contend that the Zero 
chronotope is distinct from an interregnum as Gordimer and other critics have imagi-
ned it. The interregnum suggests a space clearly bracketed by a past and future – clearly 
situated temporally. The fact that a moment occurs between two distinct periods does 
not render it atemporal. The Zero chronotope, differently, refers to a moment that pres-
ents such a crucial break from the past that a future may not be conceivable. It is within 
this type of  space that the atemporality of  the Zero chronotope becomes a possibility.
Given Gordimer’s emphasis on living in an “interregnum” prior to the end of  apart-
heid, her fiction has long been the subject of  scholarship on political temporalities, 
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yet none has yet addressed the role that time and space, or the Zero chronotope more 
specifically, might play in giving rise to an ameliorative force of  law. For example, Eleni 
Condouriotis observes how Gordimer’s fiction puts an “added burden on the reader to 
integrate disparate histories across different narrative traditions, suggesting a method 
of  reading that approximates cosmopolitan practice in the real world” (3). Discussing 
Gordimer’s novel July’s People (1981), Nasser Mufti argues that the end of  the narrative 
“promises a termination to what Gordimer described as an ‘interregnum,’ a transitory 
stage between the two regimes” (64). Mufti emphasizes that the term “interregnum,” 
borrowed from Gramsci, inherently connotes a momentary period tied both to past 
and to present in which “law is not at a ‘standstill,’ but it is precisely what is contested 
– will it apply to the old or new regime?” (65). In Mufti’s view, the “interregnum” 
that Gordimer depicts in July’s People is not free from the hegemony of  the law, and 
thus cannot be free from ideological constraints (65-6). Even reading Gordimer’s work 
through a Bakhtinian lens, few scholars have considered the ways in which her fiction 
develops new chronotopes outside the specific geopolitical moment of  apartheid and 
its aftermath, concentrating instead on a compression of  past and future. For instance, 
Mari-Ann Berg describes the mind of  Gordimer’s narrator in the short story “An Image 
of  Success” as a “chronotope, or timeplace, in its own right,” focusing on the “here-
and-now” containment of  the narrator’s position. Andrea Spain likewise observes the 
altered temporality of  the condition of  postcoloniality in Gordimer’s fiction and “the 
force of  time, the virtual past insinuating itself  within the present” (749). Most prom-
inently, perhaps, Clingman has asserted that Gordimer’s writing is “always in some way 
in dialogue with an absent future” (“Writing”13).
Other scholars have taken less nuanced views of  the temporalities within Gordi-
mer’s fiction, arguing how, for instance, “Gordimer remains identified with her muscular 
political novels that chronicle the depredation of  apartheid” (Naparstek 67). Timothy 
Brennan observes how Gordimer’s novels engage with two kinds of  laws: the laws of  
apartheid in South Africa, and the laws of  realist writing in the twentieth century (756). 
Both points suggest that Gordimer’s fiction is temporally fixed, existing firmly within 
the bounds of  a known historical temporality. J.U. Jacobs, too, argues that Gordimer’s 
novels are “overtaken by history,” with fiction that indelibly intertwines apartheid-era 
legal and literary language (25-6).
In the most basic terms, my use of  the term “literary language” refers to the narra-
tive language used to produce fiction. A specific description of  literary language, Gor-
dimer suggests, is difficult if  not impossible to produce given that literary language is 
ephemeral and necessarily contains a “transforming imaginative dimension” (Writing 
22). Gordimer distinguished between literary language and testimonial language, the 
latter of  which might create a practical record with historic and legal gravity (24). In 
distinguishing between the two, she suggested there is a sense in which literary language 
is subjective, always subject to interpretation, while legal language is in some capacities 
fixed and objective. Accordingly, on its surface, literary language is language that does 
not carry immediate weight under the law and is distinct from the legal language in its 
practical application. Yet part of  my goal in this essay is to underscore the false binary 
between literary and legal language. If  we presume that legal language carries a single, 
objective meaning while literary language has the capacity to produce multiple mean-
ings, we as readers risk making ourselves complicit in perpetuating the notion that ima-
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ginative literature cannot inform political thinking. Bizos saw value in incorporating the 
distinct language of  the law into Gordimer’s fiction, and Gordimer emphasized how, in 
a novel, “a single word had weight” much as in a legal statute (My Son’s Story 42). 
My Son’s Story develops language within its narration that eschews both the legal 
language of  apartheid-era South Africa (and other racist regimes) and the literary forms 
associated with canonical English literary studies. Sonny, a character who was “once a 
great Shakespearean reader, reverent amateur of  the power of  words,” discovers that 
“if  a term is coined it creates a self-fulfilling possibility and at the same time provides a 
formulation for dealing with it” (179). Gordimer intimates that a political-literary space 
defined by the Zero chronotope is no place for Shakespeare or for other names and 
texts that have become tropes in literary study. Instead, the intertwining of  language 
that at once refuses and draws from both legal and literary language of  the past under-
scores the need for new language and new reading practices in the Zero chronotope: 
“All the movements and syllables that had sounded there, all that had happened there, 
caught in confusion, eddying without sense, motes drifting within the walls, falling back 
from them. That’s what’s over. That’s the past, its dust not settled” (238). Analysis and 
critique of  knowable literary forms, like syllables and stress patterns, become moot. 
At the same time, legal language as it has become known – or that language used for 
purposes of  enacting and enforcing racist law – must be discarded. Indeed, at one 
point in My Son’s Story, the narrator rejects language altogether in favor of  a seemingly 
universal symbol; the word “love” (or one of  its synonyms) is replaced with an image 
of  a line-drawn heart (231). The third-person narrator in My Son’s Story refers to the 
“detritus of  common usage” employed by “the lawyer and estate agents and municipal 
officials” (11).
Rather than reading My Son’s Story as a novel that integrates past, present, and fu-
ture histories of  South Africa, or that reflects contemporary politics in its language, I 
contend instead that this particular novel divests itself  of  past and future, developing 
the Zero chronotope that resists ideological boundaries created by past law and by the 
future laws of  reconciliation that are to come. In so doing, Gordimer produces new 
language that speaks to tropes of  both legal and literary discourse, demonstrating the 
intertwined nature of  imagination and justice within the Zero chronotope. In My Son’s 
Story, for example, Gordimer insists that Sonny must redefine known English language 
for himself  given the atemporality of  the political moment in which he exists. The nar-
rator explains that “Sonny had to define to himself  what he meant by ‘before’” because 
“there was a blank in his chronology” (257). It is not that Gordimer finally locates a 
political and literary moment to depict the “new that cannot yet be born” as she does 
in July’s People, but rather that she locates a moment to create a newness that resists the 
confines of  past and future (“Living” 266). As Frederick Cooper observes, “historical 
temporality […] is ‘lumpy’: the tendency for innovation and breaks to be reabsorbed 
into ongoing discursive and organizational structures is sometimes broken by a cascade 
of  events that reconfigures the imaginable and the conceivable” (21). Citing Gordi-
mer’s own words, Andrea Spain emphasizes how “Gordimer asks us to become open 
to ‘learning to think outside the way our society [is] ordered, to reimagine modes of  living 
that might alter normality rather than reinforce its permanent alteration of  subaltern 
lives in uneven development’” (749). It is with this notion of  “learning to think outside” 
that I want to turn to the text of  My Son’s Story to demonstrate how it breaks down the 
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ideological constraints of  the law and develops a Zero chronotope in which an alternate 
force of  law might come forth.
Revisiting My Son’s Story
My Son’s Story demonstrates how literature, arising out of  a distinct time and place, 
might produce a Zero chronotope that offers an opportunity to reimagine the force of  
law. This process begins as Gordimer reveals the ideological trappings of  the law – and 
its predecessors and successors – to confirm Derrida’s intimation that such a thing as 
a “just law” cannot exist in current formulations. For example, characters in the novel 
reflect on a common dictum:
When people make violence the ultimate test of  who’s right and who’s wrong here – you 
know the argument I mean – “the struggle is no better than the oppression because 
violence on the part of  the oppressed can never be justified,” it reduces them to the level 
of  the oppressor and so on. (127)
Indeed, the novel even goes so far as to suggest that members of  the government and 
the resistance alike are put into those positions not by their own accord but instead through 
the ideological foundations of  apartheid law. During the “States of  Emergency in the 
country,” Gordimer writes, “it is the enemy – the police, the Ministers of  Law and 
Order and Justice – who decides who the leaders of  the people are” (262-3). Yet there 
may be ways to break free from those ideological constraints. Violence – a new “orig-
inary violence,” as Derrida might describe it – must be enacted upon known literary 
forms and methods of  meaning-making that have been produced by the very ideolog-
ical constraints that the violence seeks to disrupt. By breaking down these structures, 
the novel might be able to begin anew, outside the bounds of  ideology.8 The power of  
the novel lies ultimately in the possibilities it reveals for, rather than its ability to create, 
a force of  law.
To develop a Zero chronotope, the novel first must reveal the ideological trappings 
of  law, and mark them for destruction if  a new force of  law is to arise. These ideological 
boundaries of  the law show themselves as both physical, geographic borders and subor-
dinating identity borders placed upon nonwhite bodies in South Africa under apartheid. 
For the protagonist’s family, “the meaning of  life seemed to be contained […] and that 
could only mean the community to which they were confined, to which they belonged 
because the law told them so” (9). Gordimer illumines how spatial restriction becomes 
more insidious, ideologically shaping the identities of  those confined within segregated 
space. As a result of  his containment by the law, in the “sub-division of  blackness de-
cided by law” (65), Will only fantasizes about blonde, white women, whom he describes 
as “an infection brought to us by the laws that have decided what we are” (14). In all 
spaces of  the novel – public and private, communal and domestic – the characters in-
nately know: “The lawyer […] he was the power,” and the term lawyer cannot shift from 
the denotation of  a white man; others excluded from this definition also are excluded 
from positions of  power as defined by the law (232).
The racist law of  apartheid is not defined solely by this regime, however. The law of  
apartheid contains within itself  the enforceability of  racist laws of  the past, reflecting 
8. Steve Biko argued that the “banner of  liberal ideology” among whites in South Africa, despite resisting apartheid 
in name, only served to underpin the enforcing violence of  apartheid law (64).
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Derrida’s contention. Apartheid law inherently is tethered to the laws of  imperialism, 
colonization, and racist exclusion developed along a historical trajectory, and across 
various geographic spaces. To be anything other than white in South Africa, the novel 
tells its reader, is to be “judged by the laws white men made for us” (261). In this way, 
the term “the lawyer” becomes tied to the pejorative enforceability of  the law and its 
historical antecedents. Indeed, “white industrialists, churchmen, academics, liberals and 
lawyers: they were people belonging to professional and social structures within the 
law” (267). Sonny awakens at one moment in the novel to realize the historical layers 
of  South African law, and the manner in which law as a construct necessarily contains 
within itself  the racist lawmaking violence that self-perpetuates white power across time 
and space:
There flashed and plunged behind his closed eyelids a broken sequence of  men with 
white rags tied across their faces in torchlight, men on horseback carrying their flag 
with its emblem of  the swastika, the deformed shape twisted once again to the same 
purpose. White extremists were rallying to that sign; blacks who had moved into white 
neighborhoods were suffering threats and vandalism beneath it. And fear, fear. (265)
Lawmaking violence is tied to white power along a historical trajectory; apartheid law 
cannot be separated from its links to the Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany, Jim Crow 
laws promoting violence and discrimination against African Americans in the U.S. 
through much of  the twentieth century, and laws that facilitated the transatlantic slave 
trade more than a century prior.9 To be sure, Sonny “knew as a commonplace sight a 
barefoot man hobbled by ankle chains shuffling as a horror risen from the slave past 
into the memory of  computers and the glare of  the strip lighting in the anteroom” 
(228). Yet that law as a singular, layered historical entity need not have infected the fic-
tion that critiques it, Gordimer suggests. Given the possibility that imaginative literature 
might break free from ideological pressure, it also becomes a site in which the force of  
law might be made anew. Yet to remake the force of  law with an eye toward justice, 
the fiction first must enact a new kind of  “originary violence” from which it can begin 
again, and this new violence must occur in the literary Zero chronotope.
Sonny develops the power to redefine literary language – the language through 
which characters speak to “chronicle otherwise unknown human experience,” as Gor-
dimer describes it (Writing 23) – and to instill that power in others:
If  he used the vocabulary of  politics because certain words and phrases were codes 
everybody understood – no interpreter necessary, even in the English in which they were 
formulated they expanded in each individual’s hearing to carry the meaning of  his own 
frustrations, demands and desire. (112) 
Indeed, the novel explains how, as a “reverent amateur of  the power of  words, Sonny 
must have known that if  a term is coined it creates a self-fulfilling possibility” (179). The 
political power of  literary language becomes more pronounced when “long wails of  ter-
ror,” produced by apartheid law, “were cut through by the dry syllables of  shots, a sound 
hard as the steel that flies and pierces flesh and bone, goes to the heart that is bursting 
with the effort to run away and to the throat where the yell rises” (emphasis added, 116).
9. Gordimer previously discussed the “interregnum” as being tied to a global history of  oppression: “An extraordi-
narily obdurate crossbreed of  Dutch, German, English, French in the South African white settler population produced 
[…] apartheid, coining the ultimate term for every manifestation, over the ages, in many countries, of  race prejudice. 
Every country could see its semblances there; and most peoples” (“Living” 262).
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This literary language is made possible by the Zero chronotope of  the novel. My 
Son’s Story inhabits this Zero chronotope, an atemporal space into which the law increas-
ingly has difficulty reaching, marked by an aggressive, intentional stagnation of  time: 
“Waiting. All, like them, waiting” (225). This atemporality that defines the Zero chro-
notope is denoted also by a constant inconclusiveness of  time, preventing the reader 
from situating the particular moment through context clues to past or future: “a matter 
of  ‘at that time’ and ‘then’; qualifications and uncertainties” (87). While apartheid law 
governing South Africa, and any attempts within the system to change that law, neces-
sarily bear traces of  the historical violence of  lawmaking and law enforcement, the Zero 
chronotope of  My Son’s Story comes to exist outside it. Both Sonny and Will recognize 
traces of  the compressed historical temporality in their present, like those allusions to 
law in Nazi Germany or laws of  enslavement, but they nonetheless come to inhabit a 
more atemporal space in which they can produce language and knowledge that is free 
of  those ideological constraints. Indeed, once Aila is arrested for political resistance, 
“Sonny had to define to himself  what he meant by ‘before’” given that “there was a 
blank in his chronology” (257). Considering his newfound ability to act politically after 
Aila’s arrest, Will reflects on his own power “[s]o long as the length of  time that had 
passed was not measured” (260).
This unfixed political temporality – or atemporality – is defined in part by Sonny’s 
relationship with Hannah: “Its very intensity was granted on the condition that it could 
not last. Everything outside was ready to rupture it” (72). That there is a brief, limited 
time in which to reimagine an alternative force of  law is underscored by the temporal 
liminality of  the political period itself  in which the novel is written and published: “A 
man who has been convicted of  a crime against the State will continue to be watched as 
long as his life or the State that convicted him lasts; whichever endures the longer” (82).
The power of  literary language to redefine, do violence upon, and ultimately recon-
struct the layered historical systems of  language that make the law leaves the novel in a 
place from which language can begin anew. This place becomes the definitive marker of  
the Zero chronotope. It is at once a new political time-space, yet also literary time-space 
that acknowledges the previous power of  fiction. By the end of  the novel, Will recog-
nizes the Zero chronotope as giving rise to new linguistic meaning, given that “there 
were no categories of  ownership or even usage left” (273). While the plot of  the novel 
ends with a fire that destroys Sonny’s family home, Will links the “smell of  destruction, 
of  what has been consumed” with the possibility for new creation outside the bounda-
ries of  ideology with a directive to the reader: “we’re that bird, you know, it’s called the 
phoenix, that always rises again from the ashes” (274).
In a final reflexive move that underscores the ability for literary language to take on 
political force through the Zero chronotope, an epigraph of  sorts tells the reader that 
“grammar is a system of  mastering time” (275). Accordingly, in mastering time, fiction 
also has the power to change the temporality of  law and history. Here the reader is 
invited to return to earlier moments in the novel that prophesy the power both of  the 
political moment in which the novel appears, and the Zero chronotope within which 
the characters develop the power to speak and to act against the law that pejoratively 
defines them. The narrator reminds the reader of  fiction’s historic power throughout 
the novel, noting that “Kafka named what he had no names for” (17), and that Sonny 
“went to Shakespeare for a definition with more authority than those given on make-
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shift platforms in the veld” (23). Those who assume otherwise about literary language, 
the novel intimates, “people like that are so naive […]. [T]hey haven’t lived enough to 
connect words with the reality of  acts” (127). After all, Gordimer reminds her reader, 
“words, too, are stones” (32). This realization of  the potential power of  fiction is “the 
miracle that makes literature and links it with creation in itself  in the biological sense” 
(275).
My Son’s Story ultimately demonstrates how fiction can undermine the “vocabulary 
of  violence,” as Gordimer described it, through which apartheid-era law – and all law 
before it – was created. Gordimer’s fiction develops new forms of  “originary violence” 
with regard to formal structures of  English literary language. In this way, Gordimer 
engages in lawmaking violence, as Walter Benjamin suggested was necessary to produce 
justice, without the harmful counterpart of  law-enforcing violence, as Derrida argues. 
Gordimer’s work shows how literature itself  can develop the Zero chronotope in which 
an ameliorative force of  law might be conceived.
In considering the possibility that Gordimer’s fiction might enact a new force of  law, 
drawing a line to Derrida is a natural connection. Both writers demanded that fiction 
should have a political function, and that fiction-making and law-making should be 
deeply interrelated. Discussing the interrelation of  law and literature, Derrida explained: 
“What differs from one work to the other is not the content, nor is it the form […]. It is 
the movements of  framing and referentiality” (“Before” 213). Given current corruption 
within the ANC and the possibility of  another political shift in contemporary South 
Africa, My Son’s Story remains relevant in considering whether fiction has a role to play 
in re-producing the force of  law that is responsible for yielding justice. On a larger scale, 
the possibilities presented by the Zero chronotope in My Son’s Story also could have 
implications for fiction arising out of  other moments of  violence in far-reaching parts 
of  the globe, speaking to liminal geopolitical moments occurring across the world in 
which there is a distinct need to produce a new, remedial force of  law. At the same time, 
it is vital to distinguish between the theoretical ways in which literature can have trans-
formative power, and the imperfect and often messy realities of  political pragmatism. 
Fiction like My Son’s Story can offer new ways of  thinking, and can conceive of  alternate 
ways of  using language to make law. Yet the question of  how – and whether – imagina-
tive literature ever can have political currency in praxis is an inquiry we must approach 
tentatively. That Bizos saw value in producing legal language for Gordimer’s fiction sug-
gests that imaginative literature and law are interrelated, yet narrative language in fiction 
never can become a stand-in for a legal document that has immediate effects on very 
real persons, for instance. Instead, one of  the important lessons that Gordimer’s fiction 
teaches is that a novel like My Son’s Story, in opening new ways of  thinking, might be able 
to alter the theoretical positions from which law ultimately is created.
Audrey J. golden
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